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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a property case, involving a land lease between Appellants and Respondent Coeur 
d'Alene Placer Mining Company (hereinafter "Coeur d'Alene Placer"); Coeur d'Alene Placer's 
sale to Respondent IFG Timber, L.L.C. (hereinafter "IFG"); and IFG's attempt to eject 
Appellants from the proper1y that is the subject of this action. Appellants contend that, through 
their reliance on repeated representations and assurances by officers and agents of Coeur d'Alene 
Placer, Appellants had a right of first refusal with regard to the property, or in the event that 
Appellants did not purchase the Property, there was an agreement Coeur d'Alene Placer would 
purchase Appellants' buildings. While these were oral agreements, Appellants further contend 
that Respondents are estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds under the "estoppel" 
exception due to Appellants reliance upon Coeur d'Alene Placer's statements. As such, 
Appellants seek remedies for breach of these agreements, and also contest the ejectment action. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
The Complaint was filed on or about June 30, 2014. Respondent Coeur d'Alene Placer 
Answered, and Respondent IFG likewise Answered, seeking a counter-claim for common law 
Ejectment and damages. R. at 117-23 and 29-116. Both respondents subsequently moved for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, followed by a Motion for Summary Judgment (setting forth 
essentially the same arguments) on Appellants' claims against Respondents, which was granted 
by the District Court. R. at 129-248. IFG then sought summary judgment on its Counterclaim, 
which was likewise granted. R. at 255-282. Appellants moved for Reconsideration on all grants 
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of Summary Judgment, R. at 301 1 and the Motions for Reconsideration were denied on or 
about October 19, 2015. R. at 323. It is from these grants of Summary Judgment and denials of 
Reconsideration that Appellants appeal. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
In or about August of 1995, Appellants purchased several buildings located upon the 
property that is subject to this action from one Francis Gitter, for use as a residence and 
outbuildings. Record (R.) at 7. The buildings had been located upon the Property since 
approximately the 1950's, and had been owned separately from the land since they were placed 
thereon, but had likewise been leased to Appellants' predecessors-in-interest. At the time of 
Appellants' purchase and as of the date of this Brief, the buildings were, and are, not movable. 
Id.. Upon purchase of the buildings, Appellants entered into a lease of the underlying real 
property with Respondent Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Co. (hereinafter "Coeur d'Alene Placer). 
Id. While the lease between Appellants and Coeur d'Alene Placer was a renewable annual lease, 
Wilfred and Elizabeth Gardner (hereinafter "the Gardners"), who were officers/agents of Coeur 
d'Alene Placer, regularly visited Appellants, and repeatedly assured Appellants that, in the event 
that Coeur d'Alene Placer decided not to renew the lease, that Coeur d'Alene Placer would either 
give Appellants a right of first refusal on the Property, or purchase the buildings from Appellants 
at their assessed value. R. at 7-8. In reliance upon these promises, Appellants continued to 
reside upon the Property, and maintain/improve the same. R. at 8. The Gardners personally 
observed and commented favorably upon Appellants' maintenance/improvements. R. at 164. 
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Following the death ,)f Wilfred Gardner, communication between Appellants and Coeur 
d'Alene Placer was significantly reduced, but Appellants continued to renew the lease, as before, 
in reliance upon the Gardners'/Coeur d'Alene Placer's prior assurances. R. at 160. On or about 
June 23, 2012, Mr. Nicholson met with a real estate agent by the name of Kevin Boling 
(hereinafter "Boling"), who purported to be working on behalf of Coeur d'Alene Placer. Boling 
discussed the possibility that Coeur d'Alene Placer would be selling its property to the Bureau of 
Land Management, but referenced Appellants' right of first refusal, and the possibility of a sale 
to Appellants. Boling then I.old Mr. Nicholson that he would keep in contact with Appellants. R. 
at 8-9. 
Approximately six days later, Appellant W. Michael Nicholson observed survey activity 
occurring near the Property, and was informed that the survey had been commissioned by 
Boling. However, neither Boling nor Coeur d'Alene Placer made contact with Appellants until 
December of 2013 (nearly a year and a half later), at which point Appellants received a letter 
from Boling, referencing a pending sale and mentioning the possibility of a sale to Appellants, 
but containing no offer. Id. At no point did Boling communicate an offer to sell the Property or 
purchase the buildings. Id .. 
In the summer of 2012, Appellants became aware that Coeur d'Alene Placer was in the 
process of selling a neighboring portion of the Property to two persons, who had likewise been 
leasing from Coeur d'Alene Placer under a similar arrangement, but Appellants received no 
further communication from Coeur d'Alene Placer until February of 2014, when they received a 
letter from Coeur d'Alene Placer's then legal counsel stating that they were not going to renew 
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the lease. R. at 8-10. Appellants' counsel responded with an offer with regard to the Property, to 
which Coeur d'Alene Placer's counsel eventually responded to the effect that the offer would be 
passed on, but that he was skeptical as to whether it would be accepted. R. at 17-19. After no 
further communication frorn Coeur d'Alene Placer or its then-counsel, Appellants' counsel 
learned upon following up with Coeur d'Alene Placer's counsel that the Property had been sold to 
Defendant IFG Timber, L.L.C. (hereinafter "IFG") and that IFG was not interested in dealing 
with Appellants with regard to the Property. R. at 10, 22-23. Subsequently, Appellants filed the 
instant action. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellant presents the following Issues on Appeal: 
A. Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment to Respondents on 
Appellants' claims on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact, thus entitling 
them to a judgment as a matter of law with regard to Plaintiffs claims? In so holding: 
1. Did the District Court err in holding that the improvements to the Property 
could not constitute reasonable reliance so as to apply the "estoppel" exception to the 
Statute of frauds? 
11. Based upon the evidence in the record, did the District Court err in holding 
that Plaintiffs' option to purchase was exercised and rejected? 
111. Did the District Court err in holding that Defendants have the right to 
retain ownership of the buildings and improvements upon the Property, without 
compenation to Plaintiffs for the same? 
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B. Did the Di:;trict Court err in granting Summary Judgment on Counter-
claimant IFG's Counter-claim for Ejectment, on the grounds that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, thus entitling it to judgment as a matter of law with regard to the 
same? In so holding: 
1. Did the District Court err in applying Chapter 3, Title 6, Idaho Code to 
IFG's Counter-claim, when said Counter-claim was brought as a common-law Ejectment 
Claim; 
11. Alternatively, if Chapter 3, Title 6 does apply, did the District Court err in 
entering judgment for monetary damages in the same action as for possession of the Real 
Property? 
iii. Did the District Court err in rejecting Appellants' claim that the Counter-
claim lacked a sufficient legal description, and by applying the description of the 
Property contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint in entering judgment on the Counter-claim? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a grant of Summary Judgment de novo. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). A Motion for Reconsideration is reviewed pursuant 
to an abuse of discretion standard. Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 251 P .3d 602, 610 (2011 ). 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Partial Summary Judgment on 
Appellants' Claims Against Respondents. 
1. Standard for Summary Judgment. 
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In ruling upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must consider whether or not 
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is ... [a] genuine issues as to any material fact," and whether the Respondents are "entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards applicable to 
summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally construe facts in the existing record 
in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor 
of the nonmoving party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991) 
(emphasis added) (construing Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 56(c), modeled after, and substantially 
similar to, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)). 
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to 
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is [an] 
issue for trial [ifj there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return 
a verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P .2d 117, 118 (1990) 
( emphasis added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit further explained 
the term "genuine" as being "sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve 
the issue in favor either side." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 
(1995). In the same case, it further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the 
outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Id. To put it another way, summary 
judgment is appropriate only if "reasonable minds cannot differ" as to the position offered by the 
moving party, based upon the evidence available in the record. 
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Since, based upon the evidence currently the record, a rational trier fact could 
reasonably find that the Plaintiffs have: (1) established the elements of estoppel, excepting the 
agreements regarding the right of first refusal and agreement to purchase the buildings from the 
Statute of Frauds; (2) that there were said agreements in places between Appellants and Coeur 
d'Alene Placer; (3) that Coeur d'Alene Placer breached said agreements; and (5) that IFG did not 
have the right to eject Appellants from the Property (in addition to the facial deficiencies on the 
Ejectrnent counter-claim) Respondents are not entitled to a "judgment as a matter of law." 
Therefore, the District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment should be VACATED, and this 
matter REMANDED back to the District Court for further proceedings. 
2. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Improvements to the Property Could Not 
Constitute Reasonable Reliance so as to Apply the Estoppel Exception to the Statute of Frauds. 
The crux of the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment was that the Statute of 
Frauds, codified in Idaho at Idaho Code §§ 9-503 and 28-2-201, rendered any oral agreement 
between Appellants and Respondents invalid. R. at 248-53. Appellants, however, contend that 
their reliance upon the representations by the Gardners, as agents of Coeur d'Alene Placer, in 
leasing the property, renewing the lease, and improving the property places the agreement 
within the "estoppel" exception to the Statute of Frauds. R. at 231-32. "A [party] who is 
induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes position to his own detriment cannot be 
defrauded by a [party] who interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare the agreement invalid." 
Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 804, 807, 
718 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Ct. App. 1986). In the Idaho Migrant Council case, the Court of Appeals 
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also went on to say that, "since IMC's complaint states sufficient facts on its face to support a 
claim of reliance, Northwestern may not interpose the Statute of Frauds ... " Id. Similarly, 
here, the Appellants have stated many facts in their Complaint to support a claim for reliance. 
See Complaint, ,r,r 2.5-2.9, 4.2-4.3, R. at 7-8, 12. As Respondents did not submit additional 
affidavits based upon personal knowledge or admissible evidence in support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Appellants' allegations remain uncontroverted. Since it cannot be said that, 
viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, it is clear that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to no relief on this basis, Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment should 
have been denied on the grounds that Appellants have created a genuine issue of material fact 
that Defendants are estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds based on Appellants 
substantial reliance upon the oral agreement. 
On this issue of reliance, the District Court held that Plaintiffs' improvements to the 
Property could not constitute reasonable reliance so as to except the oral agreements from the 
Statute of Frauds, relying primarily upon a provision in the lease stating that such consent to 
such improvements must be made in writing. Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order for Partial Summary Judgment") at 3, R. at 250. See 
also Affidavit of Theron DeSmet in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B 
(hereinafter "Lease"), ,r 9, R. at 175-80. However, Respondents failed to present evidence in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' assertion that the Gardners, as agents of Coeur d'Alene Placer, personally 
viewed the improvements, and gave consent to the same. See Complaint, ,r,r 2.9, 6.2, R. at 8, 13; 
Affidavit of Theron DeSmet in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A 
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(hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Discovery Responses"), pp. 9-10 (Answer to Interrogatory No. 10), R. at 
163-64. This Court has held that contractual provisions requiring that a waiver from contractual 
terms be in writing may, themselves, likewise be waived. See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Life 
and Accident Co., 93 Idaho 348, 355, 461 P.2d 243, 250 (1969). Therefore, there remains a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Gardners, through their conduct, waived 
any potential claim on the part of Coeur d'Alene Placer that said improvements were in 
contravention of the lease and, therefore, that the improvements constituted reasonable reliance 
upon the Gardners' representations. As such, Summary Judgment was not appropriate on this 
finding, and this Court should grant reverse the same. 
3. The District Court Erred in Holding That the Option Was Exercised and Rejected. 
Alternatively, the District Court held that "as a matter of law, CDA placer did not not 
breach the Agreements," and that the option was exercised and rejected. Order for Partial 
Summary Judgment at 3-4, R. at 250-51 .. However, the offer from Appellants to Coeur d'Alene 
Placer was not made until q/ter, and in response to the Notice of Termination received from their 
then-counsel in early 2014. Complaint, ,r,r 2.20-2.21, R. at 10. In fact, the "rejection" was not 
communicated to Appellants or their counsel until after the sale to IFG had apparently taken 
place. Affidavit of James McMillan in Opposition to Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment ,r,r 3-4, R. at 275-76. As such, to the extend that the offer from Respondents could be 
construed as an exercise of their option to purchase, the sale to IFG prior to communicating the 
rejection of the same remains a breach of the agreement. Therefore, again, there remains a 
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genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Agreements were breached, and the Court 
should likewise vacate and remand on these grounds. 
4. The District Court Erred in Holding that Respondents Have the Right to Retain 
Ownership of the Buildings and Improvements on the Property Without Compensation to 
Plaintiffs. 
Finally, in granting Partial Summary Judgment, the District Court found that the Lease 
"includes the right to right to retain ownership of any improvements" and that such '"was the 
benefit of the bargain under the Land Lease." Order for Partial Summary Judgment at 5-6, R. at 
252-53. It was unclear whether this is a reference to the "improvements, alterations, or 
additions" referenced in Paragraph 9 of the Lease, the provision regarding disposition of 
Plaintiffs' personal property and buildings contained in Paragraph 18 of the Lease, or both. Of 
particular concern to Appellm1ts are the buildings and disposition of the same, which is expressly 
discussed in Paragraph 18. 
Paragraph 18 provides, in relevant part: 
In the event of TENANT'S failure to remove any of TENANT'S property from 
the Property, LANDLORD is hereby authorized, without liability to TENANT for 
loss or damage thereto, at the sole risk of TENANT, to remove and store any such 
property at TENANT'S expense, or to retain such property under LANDLORD'S 
control, or to sell at public or private sale, without notice, any or all of the 
property not so removed and to apply the net proceeds of such sale to the payment 
of any sum due hereunder, or to destroy such property. Further, to secure 
TENANT'S obligations under this Section 19, LANDLORD is hereby granted a 
security interest in said property (including proceeds and after acquired property) 
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
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Respondents did not produce any evidence contradicting Plaintiffs ass
ertion that it would 
be impossible to remove the buildings (which, in a preceding port
ion of the paragraph, are 
included within the same by definition), without destroying them. Th
erefore, this paragraph, by 
its terms, (a) creates a lien on Appellants' buildings; and (b) requires 
the forfeiture of the same 
upon the expiration of the Lease if there is no renewal, with no opportu
nity to redeem the same. 
To the extent that the agreement creates a lien on the buildings, R
espondents fail to 
provide evidence that said lien was perfected pursuant to the Idaho U
niform Commercial Code. 
Idaho Code§ 28-9-301 et seq. As such, any lien purported to be creat
ed by the contract remains 
unperfected. 
Next, such a contract for forfeiture is expressly prohibited by Idah
o Code § 45-110, 
which clearly states that "all contracts for the forfeiture of prop
erty subject to a lien, in 
satisfaction of the obligation secured thereby, and all contracts in
 restraint of the right of 
redemption from a lien, are void." Furthermore, "where the facts mak
e the damage agreed to an 
unconscionable penalty, equity will intercede to grant relief." Ellis v. 
Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 
648, 570 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977). Therefore, given the effect of th
e statute and the general 
equitable principle against an unconscionable forfeiture, Respondents 
are not, as a matter of law, 
entitled to retain, sell, or destroy the buildings without compensation
 to Plaintiffs for the same. 
As such, to the extent that the District Court relied upon this section in
 granting Partial Summary 
Judgment, vacation and remand of such holding is warranted. 
C. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment o
n Respondent IFG's 
Counter-claim Against Appellants. 
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1. The District Court Erred in Applying Chapter 3, Title 6, Idah
o Code to IFG's Counter-
claim, Alternatively, the District Court Erred in Entering Judgment for
 Monetary Damages in the 
Same Action. 
In its decision granting Summary Judgment on IFG's Counter-claim, the
 District Court 
found that Plaitniffs/Counter-defendants were guilty of "unlawful 
detainer." Memorandum 
Decision and Order Granting Defendant/Counterclaimant IFG T
imber LLC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order Granting IFG Summary Ju
dgment") at 6, R. at 287. 
However, while Plaintiffs rr;:cognize that an allegation of a tenant h
olding over following the 
expiration of a lease would fall within Idaho's Unlawful Detainer statu
te, Idaho Code§ 6-303(1), 
IFG elected to counter-claim for common-law ejectment instead. S
ee Answer of IFG Timber 
LLC and Counterclaim at 7-11 (hereinafter "Counterclaim"), R. at 
35-39. Further, even if the 
Counter-claim could be deemed a claim for Unlawful Detainer, IFG's
 inclusion of a claim for 
damages within the same was improper. Coe v. Bennett, 39 Idaho 17
6, 181, 226 P. 736, 737 
(1924) (holding that an Unlawful Detainer action and a cause of action
 for money damages could 
not be joined in a single suit). 
Therefore, Title 6, Chapter 3 of Idaho Code does not apply to IFG's
 Counterclaim, and 
this Court should vacate and remand the decision granting Summary 
Judgment to the extent the 
District Court relied upon the same. Alternatively, if Title 6, chapt
er 3 did apply, the District 
Court erred in granting judgment for monetary damages in the same ac
tion. 
12 
2. The District Court Erred in Rejecting Appellant's Claim that the Counter-Claim Lacked a 
Sufficient Legal Description and by Applying Appellants' Use of the Postal Address in the 
Complaint to the Counter-Claim. 
On the issue of the legal description, the District Court ruled, essentially, that the issue of 
the legal description was not properly brought before the Court, and that the description in 
Appellants' Complaint was sufficient. Order Granting IFG Summary Judgment at 12-13, R. at 
293-94. On its first finding, the District Court cited to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e), 
56(c), 7(b)(3), and 8(c). However, in raising this argument, Appellants were not bringing any 
further new evidence before the Court (56(e)), attempting to include it within written briefing in 
an untimely manner (56(c)), nor making a written motion for dismissal (or otherwise) (7(b)(3) 
(an inadequate legal description is not enumerated as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c)). 
Rather, Appellants were arguing that, due to a facial deficiency in IFG's pleading on file herein, 
it was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. However, even if the District Court were 
correct in its conclusion that the argument was not properly raised at that time, the issue was 
properly raised on reconsideration, pursuant to this Court's decision in Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 
153 Idaho 801,808,291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) and the Court of Appeals' decision in Johnson 
v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006). 
IFG's Counterclaim cites to an attached exhibit for the legal description of the property 
they are attempting to recover from Appellants. Counterclaim, 11 1-3, R. at 35. The attached 
"Exhibit A" contains two portions: A first page setting forth the "A.J. Prichard Mineral Survey 
567 and Combination Placer Mineral Survey 1762, Located at Section 35, Township 50 North, 
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Range 4 East B.M. Shoshone County, Idaho", then a leng
thy attachment, also entitled "Exhibit 
'A'," which seems to describe all of the land purchased f
rom Coeur d'Alene Placer by IFG. 
Counterclaim, Exhibit A, R. at 41-89. However, the Counte
rclaim does not set forth the portion 
of the A.J. Prichard, Comblnation, or various sundry othe
r claims that are subject to the lease, 
nor, curiously, does it set forth the description contained o
n the face of the lease, the acreage of 
the leasehold, or even the street address of the Property. 
Id. IFG simply alleges that Plaintiffs 
were leasing "a portion" of the same. Counterclaim, 13, R. at 
35. 
Following the grant of Partial Summary Judgment on Ap
pellants' claims, the allegations 
in the Complaint were no longer before the District Court;
 rather, the remaining issue was IFG's 
counterclaim. Moreover, a counterclaim, by its very n
ature, is a separate cause against the 
Plaintiff in a case, rather than an addition to the Plaintiffs
 claim against a defendant. Further, 
not only does IFG not incorporate Appellants' description
 by reference, or otherwise plead it in 
its counterclaim, but in its own Answer denies the adequac
y of Plaintiffs' description. Answer of 
IFG,, 7, R. at 30. 
Therefore, based on IFG's allegations in its Counterclai
m, even if accepted as true, it 
essentially places in the discretion of the Sheriff wh
ich "portion" of the A.J. Prichard, 
Combination, and/or other claims contained in the attachm
ent, from which to eject the Plaintiffs. 
IFG, at no point, sought to Amend its counterclaim follow
ing receipt of the Lease in the course 
of Discovery, or otherwise took the opportunity to bring
 its Counterclaim in compliance with 
Rule 90). Thus, the Counterclaim, as presented to the Co
urt, seeking the recovery of possession 
of real property, is facially insufficient. As such, IFG was
 not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
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law thereon, and this Court should likewise vacate and r
emand the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on the same. 
3. Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel to 
IFG. 
The District Court also found, inter alia, that Plaintiffs' Est
oppel theory was inapplicable 
as against IFG, and that the Estoppel claim was raised agai
nst IFG for the first time in response 
to IFG's Motion for Summary Judgment. Order Granting 
IFG Summary Judgment 8, 10, R. at 
289, 291. On the first finding, the Idaho Court of Appeals
 has held that, when a successor-in-
interest had notice of the facts which would lead to an 
estoppel against its predecessor, the 
estoppel may be asserted against the successor. M
ikesell v. Newworld Development 
Corporation, 122 Idaho 868, 874, 840 P.2d 1090, 1096 (C
t. App. 1992) (applying the estoppel 
exception to the Statute of Frauds against the vendor's suc
cessor-in-interest). Further, although 
Appellants' claims and defenses are not brought pursuant
 to the Lease, a direct analogy can 
drawn to Idaho Code § 55-303, which allows a lessee the 
same remedies against a lessor's 
successor-in-interest with regard to a lease. 
Here, Appellants alleged that IFG had knowledge of thei
r oral agreement with Coeur 
d'Alene Placer, Complaint 1 2.22, R. at 10, and that IFG would gain to ben
efit. Id. at 11 6.4-6.6, 
R. at 13. Viewing these allegations in a light most favor
able to the non-moving party, there 
arises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not I
FG was placed on sufficient notice in 
order to be likewise estopped from bringing an action to rem
ove the Nicholsons from the Subject 
Property. Furthermore, the failure to communicate th
e rejection of Appellants' offer to 
Appellants either prior to, or following, the sale to IFG, a r
ational trier of fact could reasonably 
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find that the counter-claim was barred by the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. Therefore, this 
Court should likewise vacate and remand the grant of Summary Judgment. 
With regard to the finding that Appellants raised the Estoppel argument against IFG for 
the first time on summary judgment, Appellants will call the Court's attention to their Second 
Affirmative Defense raised in their Answer to IFG's Counterclaim: 
Second Defense 
Counter-claimant waived, or by its conduct, is barred in whole or in part 
by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and consent from asserting the causes of 
action contained in the Counter-claim. 
Answer to Counterclaim, page 3, R. at 126. If the Court, by this finding, was implying that the 
Estoppel defense was waived for failure to raise as an affirmative defense pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8( c ), Appellants' pleading of the same in their Answer to IF G's Counterclaim 
would warrant a reversal of this finding, and denial of summary judgment on these grounds as 
well. 
D. The Distn~~t Court Erred in Denying Appellants' Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
As discussed above, Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration was denied. R. at 325. The 
decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration has generally been held to be in the 
discretion of the trial court. Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 251 P.3d 602, 610 (2011). In 
reviewing a matter on appeal pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard, "the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
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discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. In this case, the 
issue surrounding the District Court's grant of reconsideration is whether or not the court "acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it." 
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the District Court failed to act "consistently with 
[the] legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it." Therefore, the denial of 
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration was an abuse of discretion, and should likewise be 
reversed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be 
REVERSED, VACATED, and the matter REMANDED to the District Court with instructions 
pursuant to the legal and equitable principles set forth hereinabove. 
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